









The adage that too many chefs spoil the soup also
has its parallel in the fund management industry, as
DAVID GALLAGHER and PETER GARDNER explain.
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In Australia and throughout the world,implementation of a pension fund'sinvestment strategy typically involvesdelegating responsibility to external
investment managers, who themselves
operate independently and competitively.
In light of the fact that the portfolio
management function is commonly
executed by a number of decentralised
decision-makers, pension fund trustees
should be even more concerned about the
need to ensure optimality of the aggregate
fund's investment arrangements.
In the context of decentralised portfolio
management, Sharpe (1981) proVides an
important analysis of the problems
associated with optimal portfolio
management where a single client engages
multiple investment managers. Elton and
Gruber (2004) also argue that an overall
pension fund's investment strategy is
unlikely to be executed in an optimum
fashion, given that each component of the
client's portfolio is managed separately and
independently of the other fund managers.
While the purpose of combining different
funds into the one portfolio structure is to
proVide diversification benefits across invest-
ment process and style, diBartolomeo (1999)
argues that such an arrangement can
adversely impact on the opportunity for
the overall fund to outperform appropriate
benchmarks. In addition, given the
decentralisation of the investment
arrangements in pension fund manage-
ment, there is an increasing probability
that the alphas for each manager utilised
in the mUlti-manager structure will be
correlated, and the outcome of combining
active managers will be sub-optimal. In
terms of transaction costs ultimately borne
by the pension fund, there is the possibility
that common managers in the multi-
manager structure may be counterparties
to the same transactions, which therefore
erodes the value in alpha forecasts and
leads to economic inefficiencies.
The purpose of this study is to
empirically examine the potential problems
associated with decentralised portfolio
management, where a centralised decision-
maker (Le. pension fund trustees) delegates
investment responsibility to a number of
independent and competitive equity fund
managers. We perform a simulation
analysis for a sample of Australian equity
managers using monthly portfolio
holdings.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We examine the issue of portfolio blending
at the portfolio holdings level for active
Australian equity managers who have an
exante tracking error exceeding 100 basis
points per annum. Our sample comprises
the monthly portfolio holdings of 38
institutional eqUity funds in the period
January 1994 to June 2002, sourced from
the Portfolio Analytics Database. The funds
represent the largest publicly offered
institutional products for each of the
participating investment management
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FIGURE 1: SUMMED DIFFERENCE OF MONTHLY PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS FROM INDEX
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For each monthly period in our sample, we sum the All Ordinaries Index weight for stocks within certain bands.
Next, after equally weighting managers we sum the difference between the manager weight and index weight in the
particular band. We measure this relative weight for just growth, value, GARP, and Style Neutral managers. Lastly, we
measure the relative weight for funds divided into quartiles, based upon size.
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deviation of portfolio holdings for active
equity managers is approximately 29.
Due to the high stock concentration
amongst the largest Australian-listed
stocks, active managers tend to hold
the majority of the largest stocks in the
benchmark. We found that the
proportional ownership of stocks by ~
active lnanagers held in their portfolios ~
and ranked in the largest 10, 20, 30 and g-
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For each monthly period we sum the absolute value of the difference between the manager weight and the index
weight in stocks in the All Ordinaries Index. Next, we add other managers to our portfolio, equally weighting the
pension funds amongst the active managers. We then again sum the difference between the manager weights and
the index weights. We simulate this 500 times taking random managers each time to add to the portfolio, without
replacement. We average the difference in holdings across periods and across simulations. We also complete this
test for just growth, value, GARP, bank and boutique managers. Lastly, we complete the test taking the highest
performing managers over the prior three months, as well as the largest to smallest and smallest to largest managers.
stock in the index accounts for an eight
per cent weighting, and the aggregate
proportion of stocks ranked as the
largest five, 10 and 20 stocks constitute
approximately 30, 47 and 62 per cent
of the index.
Research by Brands, Brown and
Gallagher (2003) using the Australian
database shows that on average, active
equity managers hold 57 stocks, and a
median of 50 securities. The standard
TABLE 1: RELATIVE WEIGHT POSITION WITH INDEX
Index Allmgrs Growth GARP Value Style 01 02 03 04
Weight Neutral (Small) (Large)
Top 5 31.4% -2.6% -1.0% -0.4% -5.2% -0.1% -3.9% -0.2% -4.5% -2.5%
5-10 13.6% 0.0% 1.8% 1.0% -1.4% 0.5% 0.4% 1.8% -0.8% -1.1%
11-20 13.2% -0.4% 3.6% -1.6% -2.0% 0.3% -0.6% 1.2% -1.0% -1.2%
21-50 18.8% -0.5% -0.9% -0.7% 0.2% -1.6% -0.3% -1.2% 0.2% -0.7%
51-100 11.6% 0.6% -0.6% -0.4% 1.1% 0.4% 2.6% -0.6% 0.9% 0.0%
101-200 9.3% -0.8% -3.1% -1.8% 1.4% -2.3% -1.1% -3.2% 0.7% 0.1%
200- 2.2% -0.5% -1.7% -0.2% 0.1% -0.7% -0.7% -1.3% -0.1% 0.1%
All Ords
Outside 0.0% 4.3% 1.9% 4.1% 5.9% 3.4% 3.5% 3.4% 4.6% 5.4%
All Ords
companies, and the funds are
benchmarked to either the S&P/ASX
200 or 300 Accumulation Indices. 1
Our sample is representative of the
Australian investment management
industry and includes six of the largest
10 managers, six of the next 10, four
from those managers ranked 21-30, and
14 managers from outside the largest
30. We also include funds with various
investment styles (Le. value (12), growth
(4), growth-at-a-reasonable-price (11),
style neutral (11), etc.), and operated by
different types of companies (Le. bank
or life-office affiliated, boutique, large
versus small firms).
In addition to the use of portfolio
holdings data, we obtained ASX SEATS
data from the Securities Industry
Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA),
which includes stock price information
for valuation purposes at month-end,
S&P/ASX historical index constituents
and securities weights, and industry
classifications defined by the Global
Industry Classification Standard
(GICS®) for each stock (which was
developed jointly by S&P and MSCI).
Our first objective is to briefly
examine Australia's concentrated
investment management industry as
well as the small number of ASX-listed
stocks which dominate the market
index. The Australian market is unique
relative to many of the larger markets,
in particular the largest and most liqUid
capital market in the world-the United
States.
Concentration is important from a
portfolio blending perspective, because
the narrower the set of choices of stocks
which can be held by portfolio
managers within any given universe of
securities, the greater the probability
that fund managers will hold similar
portfolios of stocks.
In terms of aggregate manager size
at March 2002, the largest five and 10
managers accounted for approximately
45 per cent and 69 per cent, respectively.
The largest 20 investment managers in
Australian eqUities control almost 90
per cent of total industry assets. In
terms of stock index weights in the ASX
All Ordinaries benchmark (the broadest
equity market index), the size of
companies listed on the exchange is
also similarly concentrated. The largest
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holding 78'XI, 68%, 60% and 52%,
respectively, of the largest securities in
their funds.
In terms of the proportional positions
held overweight according to stocks
ranked by size, the evidence indicates a
monotonically decreasing function of
active bets held overweight, where the
largest 10 stocks are held overweight 52
per cent of the time and the largest 40
stocks are held overweight 39 per cent.
We report further descriptive statistics
for our sample in Table 1 (see previous
page). We find that on average, fund
managers underweight the largest five
stocks, particularly small and value
managers. Fund managers on average
hold over four per cent of their
portfolio in stocks not listed in the
index (genuine small stocks, and also
larger stocks which are later included in
the index, IPOs). This position is most
substantial for large and value
managers. Managers also tend to
overweight stocks 51-100.
We also examine the trading activity
of active managers in our sample,
where portfolio turnover is defined as
the minimum of buys/sells divided by
the average net assets of the fund (per
annum). This variable is important in
estimating the frequency of trading,
and therefore the potential overlap in
trading that might arise where the
industry is highly concentrated in
stocks and across competitors. Using
monthly data, we find that the funds'
turnover ratio is on average 1.16 times
fund assets per year, with a standard
deviation of 0.39. This indicates that
the managers in our sample are highly
active and turn over their securities on




The aim of our first test is to quantify
~
'" the level of erosion in the active bets of
~
~ active Australian equity managers using
~ simulation analysis. For each month-
,... end period, we sunl the absolute vaJue
~ of the difference between the manager's
- weight and the index weight of
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constituent stocks in the S&P/ASX All
Ordinaries Index. This measure,
expressed in percentage terms, provides
an overall analysis of the divergence of
the aggregate portfolio's holding from
the underlying index.
Using simulation analysis, we select
individual managers to participate in
the aggregate portfolio by equally
weighting all funds within a single
portfolio structure to a maximum of 10
managers. The use of a 'l/n Rule' in
describing investor choice has been
highlighted in a number of recent
studies. 2 We perform a cut-off at 10
managers for a number of reasons, the
two most important being that the
likelihood of more than 10 mandates
appearing in a single pension fund intra
asset class is low, as well as the
empirical results showing that the
magnitude of active bet size decreases at
a decreasing rate. Hubennan and ]iang
(2004) also confirm that 401k pension
plan investors select a relatively small
number of funds, typically not
exceeding three or four funds, and this
number is found to be insensitive
relative to the number of choices
available in the plan.
We simulate each portfolio
combination 500 times, drawing
random managers each time as we
add to the aggregate portfolio without
replacement. We average the difference
in holdings both across periods and
across simulations. We also undertake
this test using constraints on the
selection procedure according to a
single investment style (namely
growth, growth at a reasonable price,
and value) and ownership structure
(whether bank affiliated or a boutique
manager). We also perform a portfolio
selection procedure that is conditional
on selecting funds from the largest to
smallest, smallest to largest, and best
to worst performing managers.:{ A
portfolio with constituents completely
different from the index would receive
a value of two using this measure, and a
value of one represents a portfolio with
half its weight contained within the
index (See Figure] on previous page).
Consistent with the theory of
portfolio selection and diversification,
as new managers are progressively
added to the single portfol!o structure,
the difference between th€}; aggregated
and equally weighted portfolio relative
to the benchmark decreases. This is
consistent with the active bets on
stocks for each individual manager
being eroded by the positions taken in
stocks by other managers.4
Figure 1 reveals that the rate of decay
in a manager's active bets relative to the
benchmark is similar for all managers,
and managers affiliated with either a
bank/life-office finn or boutique
managers. However, when we examine
managers according to self-reported
investment style (particularly growth
and value managers), the erosion is
lower and indicates that active
managers implementing consistent
styles tend to take similar bets in stocks
with comparable characteristics. The
difference in the portfolio from the
index is greater for the highest perform-
ing managers, which is indicative of the
fact that better performing managers
tend to have higher differentiation in
their portfolio positions compared to
the average manager.
We next extend our analysis by
directly quantifying the change in
unique portfolio holdings and their
impact on the multi-fund's tracking
error. An investor should expect that at
the limit, where successive active funds
are added to the overall portfolio, the
portfolio's number of unique stock
holdings will gradually increase, and
the level of tracking error volatility will
decline. We should also expect variation
across fund selection practices,
depending on whether the portfolio is
constructed within a single investment
style or across investment styles. We
construct multi-fund portfolios using
simulation analysis which is repeated
500 times (without replacement) each
for]) portfolios selected as random
constituents, 2) portfolios selected from
within a certain style of fund manager,
3) the largest to smallest and 4) smallest
to largest managers.
JASSA ISStH 4 SUMMH: ~OlJlj
1----------
Figure 2 (see next page) shows that as
successive funds are added to the single
portfolio, the number of unique stocks
added to the portfolio increases at a
decreasing rate. An interesting issue is
that the average growth manager holds
a significantly smaller number of stocks
in their portfolio relative to managers
implementing other investment styles.
This illustrates that growth managers
hold more concentrated portfolios.
Value managers and boutique managers
also tend to hold less unique stocks
than the average manager, in contrast
to GARP managers and managers
affiliated with banks, which tend to
exhibit more diverse stock holdings.
Unsurprisingly, large managers also tend
to hold a higher number of stocks
compared to small managers, which is
consistent with a large manager
attempting to minimise market impact
costs from trading large positions.
Figure 3 (see next page) shows the
effects on tracking error where funds are
added to the single portfolio structure.
The evidence shows a significant
deterioration in tracking error. By
definition, a tracking error of zero is
equivalent to the underlying
benchmark, and as more funds are
added to the portfolio on an equally
weighted basis, tracking error
magnitude erodes by a factor of at least
half of the one fund case where a
portfolio comprises 10 funds (except
growth funds and high-to-Iow
performing fund categories). The
tracking error of boutique managers
(which is also highly correlated with
manager size) also decreases
significantly. The evidence presented
shows that active manager blending can
have significant implications for the
ability of active management to earn
superior returns to the benchmark.
Our analysis next provides an
examination of the potential for active
funds to trade as counterparties to one
another within a single portfolio
structure. During a certain period, if one
manager was to purchase a certain
stock, while simultaneously another
manager sold the same security, this
IASSA ISSUE 4 SUMMr:~ 2005
would result in zero net change to the
overall portfolio's exposure of the
security.
However, engaging in a transaction
where two managers are the buyer and
seller incurs two separate brokerage
commissions attributable to the same
parcel, as well as the crystallisation of
capital gains/losses on the sale of stock.
The propensity for cross-trading
between commonly held fund managers
by the single portfolio structure will be
amplified where the securities market is
highly concentrated and where the
number and size of participants offering
investment services is not highly
diverse. This situation is of particular
concern in Australia, and represents an
interesting empirical problem that can
be answered using a unique and highly
granular dataset of the holdings and
trades of active investment managers.
We calculate the level of net trades of
managers (where the buys of one
manager in a certain stock are negated
by the sells of another manager in that
same stock) divided by the total trades
(buys plus sells) of the managers. We
calculate this for a single portfolio
manager, and then add managers
progressively until 10 managers are
included in the overall portfolio
structure. We simulate this 500 times,
equally weighting across monthly
periods for the funds in our sample.
Figure 4 (see page 25) shows the
proportion of fund assets where
common managers buy and sell the
same securities within a one-period
window. Our measure of net monthly
trading in specific securities is
quantified as follows. Using an equally
weighted portfolio methodology, we
identify all trades in particular stocks
executed by individual managers, and
then take the difference between buys
and sells, and then divide by the total
market value of trading (i.e. buys plus
sells). For the one manager case, by
definition there are no competing or
contradictory trades from using other
managers.
However, once we progressively
configure a multi-fund portfolio of
active managers, the evidence suggests
that an economically significant
proportion of the trades executed by
individual managers are fractionally
reversed by the trades of other
managers in individual stocks. Given
that individual managers are themselves
competitors, and execute their trade
strategies without reference to one
another, where these funds are
combined into a single portfolio, the
aggregate fund incurs unnecessarily
high transaction costs.
Figure 4 shows that if 10 managers
are included in a single portfolio, then
if unnecessary trading was excluded,
the multi-fund structure would save
approximately 30 per cent of their
trading costs for a lO-manager
portfolio. The extent of overlap in
trading is not as substantial for growth
managers, which suggests that growth
managers tend to trade more often in
the same direction as other growth
managers (although we also recognise
that our sample of growth managers is
very small).
For comparison purposes, we also
examine cross-trading between
managers across individual industries,
and these results are presented in Figure
5 (see page 25). Given this approach
relies on aggregating stocks into larger
groups, one should expect our measure
will increase the probability of the
sector bets of active managers being
fractionally unwound by other funds in
the multi-fund portfolio. We can
identify that this is indeed the case, and
at the la-manager portfolio, the erosion
is between 35 and 40lYcl (excluding
Australian growth funds).
CONClUSION
We examine the potential impact of
manager configuration or portfolio
blending strategies that might be
adopted by pension fund trustees or
multiple manager providers. Using
simulation analysis with month-end
portfolio holdings for actively managed
Australian equity managers, we provide
an ana!,ysis of the various portfolio
blends that might arise when additional
23
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FIGURE 3: TRACKING ERROR IN MONTHLY PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF UNIQUE STOCKS IN MONTHLY PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS
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diBartolomeo, D. (1999), A Radical
Proposal for the Operation of Multi-
Manager Investment Funds, Working
Paper, Northfield Information
Services.
Elton, E., Gruber, M. (2004), Optimum
Centralized Portfolio Construction with
Decentralized Portfolio Management,






"\ -+- Random_Growth f---\ Value_GARP
\ -.- BouliQue f----+-Bank_+_ High to Low Pertormance f---,. Large to Small
~








""g 120 I-- ---::""""=-=",.-"""'_=:;.....--:~
Ui
-+- Random /_g. 100l-----~,.L.=:.,~~=-~.-::~~=:::::..:::...---_l_ Growth "
~60 ~
.; _GARP
z 60 -.- Boutique
40 -+- BankI-~.=.,=-....a:=---------------_i_+_ High to Low Pertormance
20 -- Large to Small







We calculate the tracking error of the portfolio with respect to the Australian All Ordinaries using monthly returns. As
we add more managers (keeping them equally weighted), we average their performances to create the portfolio
performance, to determine the tracking error of the portfolio. Once again, we simulated this 500 times for random,
growth, value, GARP, bank and boutique managers, as well as for the best-ta-worst performers, the largest to
smallest and smallest to largest managers.
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active equity portfolios are added to a
single portfolio structure.
We document significant erosion in
the active bets of stocks held in blended
portfolios, although blending within
style-specific categories shows less
pronounced deterioration in the net
active exposures across stocks for fund-
of-fund structures. Overall, active
portfolio blending, in terms of portfolio
composition and fund performance,
potentially represents a potentially
significant economic efficiency problem.
At the limit, as active managers are
blended together in a single portfolio
structure, the opportunities to generate
positive alpha diminish, and net
portfolio returns from this strategy
will be inferior to that of a passively
managed fund after costs.
In addition, a significant problem for
fund-of-fund portfolios utilising the
services of active managers is that given
the high frequency of trading, there is
the chance that single portfolio
structures engaging common managers
will actively trade with one another.
If this arises, the overall fund structure
incurs unnecessary trading costs
(e.g. brokerage) and the crystallisation
of tax liabilities, for little or no net
change in beneficial ownership.
In this study, we use simulation
analysis to document that up to 30
per cent of trading in any month is
performed by two managers who
comprise a blended portfolio. Improved
efficiencies in active portfolio design
are most likely to be achieved where an
agent is permitted to construct and
maintain a single portfolio structure
comprising active managers that does
not erode the active investment
opportunities offered by these
institutions. Future research is currently
examining these issues.
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1 The ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation
Index is applicable as the appropriate
benchmark prior to 3 April 2000. Post
the index change to 30 June 2002, the
correlation in returns between the new
All Ordinaries 200 and 300 benchmarks
is extremely high (>0.995), which
further highlights the high
concentration of stocks in existence on
the Australian Stock Exchange.
2 See Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and
Elton, Gruber and Blake (2004).
3 We calculate performance over the
prior three months.
We calculate the level of the net monthly trades of managers at an industry level (where the buys of one manager in
a certain industry are negated by the sells of another manager in that same industry) divided by the total monthly
trades (buys plus sells) of the managers. Once again, we calculate this for a portfolio of one manager (yielding a
value of one, as the net trades must equal the total trades), and then add managers until we have 10 managers in
the portfolio. We simulate this 500 times, averaging across periods, in order to achieve a good average measure
across various fund managers.
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analysis.
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